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ABSTRACT
The theory of this thesis is that U.S. Court of Appeals case decisions influence rule
changes made by the FDA. My hypotheses are (1) Republican appointed judges will favor
businesses more often than Democrat appointed judges, (2) when businesses are favored more
than consumers the FDA will reduce regulation, and (3) when regulation is reduced there will be
an increase in drug approvals. hypothesis 4 states drug approvals decrease when Democrats hold
a majority. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were all tested using a 2 analysis for the years 2010, 2011,
2015, and 2016. A descriptive analysis of FDA policy changes is also complete for hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 4 is tested using a time series analysis. Hypotheses 1 and 3 found support.
However, the findings of hypothesis 2 suggest political make-up matters more than case
decisions. Table 5 supports hypothesis 4, but table 6 does not.
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INTRODUCTION

Does the health and general welfare of our nation depend on the identity of non-elected
leaders? I believe there is a chance of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
being influenced by the United States Courts of Appeals. To evaluate this assumption, we will
need to establish the research of my predecessors who greatly influenced my belief. There are
four literature review sections in this thesis. Primarily, we are focusing on principal-agent theory.
Principal-agent theory attempts to predict the influence of principles on the actions of agents; in
this case, the Court of Appeals’ influence on the FDA. We know that judges influence the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Howard and Nixon 2003). Howard and Nixon did a study to test
if the IRS was influenced by the judiciary’s majority ideology. What they found was under a
conservative Appeals court majority, the IRS would audit individuals more often than businesses
(Howard and Nixon 2003). Of course, the oversight of the judiciary on administrative agencies is
not limited to the U.S. Appeals Courts’ authority over the IRS.
This research thesis hopes to add onto the current conversation within literature and
research regarding known FDA influencers, ideological decisions of judges, and principle-agent
theory. It has come to my concern that the health and general welfare of our nation may depend
on the identity of non-elected leaders. It is the primary concern of this thesis to discover if the
FDA’s drug regulation policy decisions and annual drug approvals are influenced by the courts.
To establish more known FDA influences I am analyzing if the FDA makes different rule
changes or consistent variations in drug approvals when the courts change how they rule on
cases. I also believe that courts change how they rule on cases primarily when the majority
ideology changes. If my theory is correct, this will establish the judiciary as an influencer of the
FDA. Therefore, supporting principle-agent theory and adding another example to the existing
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literature. The information we currently have on ideological decision making and the prediction
of choices made by judges based on their political appointment is not extensive. There is
currently no known literature regarding how Appeals Court judges, Republican or Democrat,
rule on pharmaceutical liability cases. There will be literature answering that question by the
time this thesis is done. If Republican and Democrat appointed judges consistently make
difference decisions than each other, it would support positive theory. Because it would show
that the decisions of judges can be predicted by the judge’s political affiliation.
This thesis is very important for two major reasons. Firstly, this thesis will determine if
scientist decisions that impact public health are influenced by non-elected political leaders.
Secondly, it answers an important question of what the difference between decisions made by
Republican and Democrat appointed judges could be. Answering this question brings us a step
closer to “what is liberal and what is conservative” (Howard and Steigerwalt 2012). Many
Political Scientist who study the courts hope to predict votes and measure ideology. Future
research focusing on pharmaceutical product liability could use this thesis as a guide to what is
likely a conservative or liberal decision. Our results show that over U.S. Court of Appeals
Republican appointed judges rule in favor pharmaceutical drug manufacturers 48% more often
than their Democrat appointed peers. If we consider most Republicans to be conservative, then it
is likely that conservatives are more likely to rule in favor of pharmaceutical manufactures than
liberals. This statement is also consistent with Supreme Court decisions. With that said, I find the
first reason much more meaningful. Many Americans rely on safe and effective medication. For
the regulation of these drugs to be contingent on the party affiliation or ideology of judges is
worrying to say the least. If it is the case that the U.S. Court of Appeals influences drug
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regulation done by the FDA, then a cost benefit analysis would be required by future research.
Those who rely on medication deserve to know how to vote in their best interests.
This thesis seeks to establish known FDA influences, how our legal system works, the
process of New Drug Application (NDA), how the judiciary influences agency decisions, that
judges have political policy preferences, court decisions often favor the ideology of the judge,
and that the ideology of judges influences FDA drug regulation policy. The theory of this thesis
is that (a) the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals influence rule changes made by the FDA,
(b) that political affiliation influences judges to make different decisions on cases concerning
pharmaceutical liability, (c) when the ideological majority of the Court of Appeals shifts we
expect to see a change in the types of decisions made, and (d) the FDA’s rule changes will be
influenced by the court’s decisions. The reason I believe the U.S. Court of Appeals attempts to
influence the FDA is because the judges in those courts have policy preferences they wish to see
come into fruition, and the FDA fears having its scientific authority and autonomy challenged by
the courts. Judges have a chance at their preferences becoming policy when they create
precedent that favors their wants, and the FDA does not want that precedent to negatively affect
them. The research completed in this thesis will add to the conversation of principle-agent theory
and effect of ideological bias in the courts. Public debate regarding general welfare, the
legitimacy of our courts, drug safety, and trust toward health agencies like the FDA is growing in
modern political conversation (Annenberg Public Policy Center 2021; Braman and Easter 2014;
Olsen and Whalen 2009; The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2021). Not only will finding the
answers to my questions contribute to the scholarly research regarding principle-agent theory and
legal ethics, but it may also contribute to current political debate.
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My hypotheses are (1) in the U.S. Court of Appeals Republican appointed judges will
favor businesses more often than Democrat appointed judges, (2) when the U.S. Court of
Appeals favors business more often than consumers the FDA will reduce regulation requirements
for drug manufacturers, and (3) when the FDA reduces regulation there will be an increase in the
overall number of annual drug approvals. Lastly, hypothesis 4 states that the FDA reduces drug
approvals when Democrats hold a majority in the U.S. Court of Appeals. Therefore, (4) drug
approvals will increase the year following a Republican appointed majority in the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were all tested using a 2 analysis for the years 2010, 2011,
2015, and 2016. Results for hypothesis 2 were mixed. To test hypothesis 4, I used a time series
analysis testing all years from 1940 to 1990. The time series analysis found mixed results.
Without a lagged dependent variable, there was a strong correlation between party affiliation of
the U.S. Court of Appeals and annual drug approvals. However, there was no significance found
after the lagged dependent variable was included in the analysis. The first test had a Republican
appointed majority, and most case decisions were ruled in favor of businesses. For both 2010 and
2011, which are the majority Republican years, the FDA decreased regulation requirements for
businesses. However, in 2015 and 2016 majority of the decisions still favored businesses. While
the gap between businesses and consumers decreased, there was still a disparity in decisions.
Despite this fact, the FDA decreased regulatory requirements following 2015 and 2016. The
major difference between 2015 and 2016 is that Democrat appointed judges now held a majority
in the U.S. Court of Appeals. It is indeed true that Democrat appointed judges favored consumers
more often than their Republican peers. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is true and there were no mixed
results in either analysis regarding this. Lastly, hypothesis 3 also found support. When the FDA
reduced regulation in 2010 and 2011 there was an increase in drug approvals the following year.
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In 2015 and 2016 when the FDA increased regulation there was a decrease in drug approvals the
following year.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Law and Drug Regulation
Before exploring the literature and research of principle agent theory and the other

theoretical beliefs this thesis hopes to thoroughly explain, we must first discuss how our legal
system works. Our legal system operates on the idea that an individual must first file a complaint
to start court activity. To gain standing in the courts, specific requirements must be met,
particularly if one is to build a case against large pharmaceutical manufactures or bureaucratic
institutions like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This article is focused on the FDA;
because of this, we will only be discussing health care/pharmaceutical personal injury and
product liability cases.
For a drug to be marked legally to the public, it must first become FDA approved. New
drugs must go through the NDA. In the United States, "every new drug has been the subject of
an approved NDA before U.S. commercialization" (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2019).
During this process, the "FDA reviews the drug's professional labeling and assures appropriate
information is communicated to health care professionals and consumers" (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration 2019). After this process is complete, it is marketed to the public and sold to drug
consumers and healthcare providers.
If an issue occurs regarding an FDA-approved drug, either with the state or an individual
consumer, then litigation may ensue. Pharmaceutical products liability is the main legal battle
drug consumers are likely to engage in. The leading players in these cases are usually drug
manufacturers and drug consumers. The courts are the only option of relief for drug consumers
(Cooper 1986). The FDA cannot offer relief; all they can do is either increase or decrease the
regulation of drug manufacturers (Cooper 1986). The regulation of pharmaceutical manufactures
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is complex and controversial. Despite the controversy, drug litigation plays a significant role in
public health, public law, and private law (McCuskey 2018). It has become a recent trend to
decrease the regulation of generic drugs to decrease their prices, but the increase in economic
gains comes at the cost of public health and lower quality drugs (Lindenfeld and Tran 2015;
McCuskey 2018). However, these efforts to decrease prices have not worked, there is research
that shows decreasing regulations and giving immunities to drug manufacturers have "done
nothing to combat the price of drugs" and that it has only decreased "thorough premarket testing
and studies, putting consumers of generic drugs at an increased risk of injury" (Lindenfeld and
Tran 2015). If Lindenfeld and Tran are correct, then not only does decreasing regulations not
reduce the price of drugs, but it allows the market to be filled with drugs that have an "increased
risk of injury" (Lindenfeld and Tran 2015).
The Supreme Court has added to the debate by stating that the "proper role of federal
regulation and state tort laws in promoting product safety" (Davis 2007). The courts used to
focus on protecting consumers and giving injured consumers relief, but in recent times, the
courts' view additional state drug regulation and consumer protections as a threat to
manufacturers and the legitimacy of the FDA (Davis 2007). Some courts have questioned if state
laws make it impossible for manufacturers to "comply with both state and federal law" (Sharkey
2008). This may be a change in the legal interpretation of administrative law; however, it may
also be because of a change in the political beliefs of the majority of seated judges. Later in this
thesis, we will discuss judicial ideology and the political actions of the courts.
2.2

Known FDA Influences
All administrative agencies are at risk of being challenged and being checked by the

judiciary. Because of this, our nation’s health agencies are also able to be challenged and

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

8

checked by the judicial branch of government. I believe it is likely that health agencies, such as
those under the HHS, are also influenced by the judiciary. It is the primary concern of this thesis
to discover if the FDA’s drug regulation policy decisions are influenced by the courts. There is
already research showing that the courts played an important role in the FDA’s changes to
tobacco regulation (Lax and McCubbins 2006). Lax and McCubbins found that judiciary does
“wield decisive power over tobacco regulation and their decisions had a major impact on the
probability that tobacco would ultimately be regulated by the FDA” (Lax and McCubbins 2006).
While this does not show that the judiciary plays a powerful role in drug regulation, it does show
that the judiciary has the potential ability to influence the FDA when it comes to regulation.
However, there is no literature surrounding how the judiciary influences drug regulation. We do
not know if any part of the judicial branch influences drug approvals, pharmaceutical policy,
medication labeling requirements, or any other FDA drug related decisions. This research thesis
hopes to add onto the current conversation within literature and research regarding principleagent theory by showing that even in areas that require high scientific and health related
expertise, such as pharmaceutical regulation and drug approval, the U.S. Court of Appeals can
still influence the decisions made by administrative agencies and the experts within them.
The FDA is the federally agency that controls what drugs get approved and the drug
regulations manufactures must follow in order to sell their product. Something that must be
followed is the FDA’s guidelines on labeling. Failure to follow labeling guidelines could result
in recall of the drug and even a lawsuit against the manufacture. Are the actions of the FDA
influenced by anything? It is believed that the FDA may be influenced by many different things
and institutions. Agencies may make “policy decisions within given regimes and may be
constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times” (Shipan 2000).
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During 1972-92 the FDA was under pressure to increase product approvals, and to get this done
the FDA reduced monitoring and substituted less resource-intensive enforcement (M. K. Olson
1995). This basically means that there was less regulation and the FDA checked products less
often. During this time, the median ideology of the Supreme Court was conservative. Which
would lead one to believe that conservative justices favor less regulation. With less regulation,
the FDA would be able to increase annual drug approvals with ease.
Does the funding of the FDA influence their drug approvals? The source of the FDA’s
funding does not likely play a major role in the variation of New Drug Application (NDA)
approval (Carpenter et al. 2003). However, the “amount of resources devoted to the FDA” does
explain variation in NDA approvals (Carpenter et al. 2003). If the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER) receives more funding, they can increase their staff. Increasing the
number of CDER staff members has a significant impact on shortening the duration of NDA
reviews (Carpenter et al. 2003). Which would increase the amount of drug approvals. With that
being said, there is a study that suggest increased funding and resources alone are not enough to
explain the increase in drug approvals and decrease in drug-review times (M. K. Olson 2004).
Do the other branches of government influence the FDA? There are studies that support
the idea that the president influences many federal agencies; however, the extent of this influence
is not precise and is not focused on the FDA specifically (Clinton, Lewis, and Selin 2014;
Howell and Lewis 2002). The president is the one who appoints people to the FDA (Furlong
1998). The presidents can appoint people to the FDA, or practically any executive federal
agency, that agree and will listen to them. The President may also use their powers to make
budget changes and use the Office of Management and Budget review actions to influence
federal agencies like the FDA (Furlong 1998). President Clinton liked to go public and have
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media attention for his announcements against tobacco companies (Cook 2001). Signaling to
Congress, the judiciary, the public, and the FDA what his preferences were regarding tobacco.
A study found that “the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in
Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously” (Shipan 2004).
However, this same study also found that elected politicians do not influence the FDA in any
linear fashion. It appears that under some conditions Congress can influence the FDA, but under
many conditions Congress does not influence the FDA (Shipan 2004). With that being said, if
the FDA deviates from congressional preference, then Congress may cut FDA funding from the
budget (Hermes 2001). If Congress were to cut funding, that would decrease FDA drug
approvals (Carpenter et al. 2003). While it may be difficult to show that any particular agency is
subject to either capture or congressional control, it is very likely that the FDA can be influenced
by Congress (M. K. Olson 1995). However, it is believed that modern Congress delegates power
to administrative agencies in convenience (Lawson 1994). This allows agencies like the FDA to
work without contently requesting for jurisdiction or permission. The reason Congress did this
may indicate that they wanted the FDA to operate with little political influence.
There is also a study that supports the idea that the judiciary plays a major role in
influencing the FDA, this study shows that the courts have influenced the FDA through tobacco
litigation (Lax and McCubbins 2006). There used to be much controversy regarding the harmful
effects of tobacco on public health. These debates did not stop at social discourse; they were
taken to the courts. Lax and McCubbins concluded that the court do “wield decisive power over
tobacco regulation and their decisions had a major impact on the probability that tobacco would
ultimately be regulated by the FDA” (Lax and McCubbins 2006). The legal and financial
pressure that the courts can put on the FDA and businesses is believed to be a strong influencer.
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The FDA might want to act in the best interest of judges to avoid court. Especially when “the
decision of a single district court judge” can cost one reputational and financial harm (Lax and
McCubbins 2006).
In regard to drug regulation and labeling, the FDA has filed multiple "amicus briefs
expressing the view that the FDA approval should preempt failure-to-warn claims in prescription
drug cases" (Masters 2014). The courts have not fully adopted the wants of the FDA, but
conservative decisions like Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett1 do lean in that direction
(Masters 2014; Wolfman and King 2013). This would suggest that rather than the courts
influencing the FDA, the FDA is the principle that influences the judiciary agents. We will
discuss Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett later in this article; alongside another Supreme
Court decision that had a liberal majority called Wyeth v. Levine2.
2.3

Judicial Oversight and Agency Relationships
This section will discuss the relationship the court has with bureaucracies and specifically

the FDA. The courts are able to review almost any of the FDA’s actions. The courts are able to
do this through judicial review. Most legal issues regarding drugs and the FDA are going to be
related to regulations and procedures that the manufacturers are supposed to follow. The courts
are able to preside over these issues because of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Judicial review is supposed to prevent agencies from overstepping their bounds and deter them
from acting when their action in not appropriate (Seidenfeld 2009). Agencies are made with a
statutory authority, and it is important to make sure that agencies stay focused on their purpose.
Meaning that the FDA should make policies regarding drug approvals, regulations on the

1

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 570 U.S. 472, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607
(2013).
2 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 173 L. Ed. 2d 51 (2009).
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manufacture, and drug labeling requirements. The FDA should not be regulating the carbon
emissions of factories. The courts review these actions, and the manufacture may be sued when
they do not follow the regulations legally put in place by the FDA.
This idea that the judiciary influences agency actions, besides making direct
changes via case decisions, is central to principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory is one of
the essential theories and primary principles that this thesis is discussing. The foundation of
principle agent theory regarding the courts is this belief that "judicial review of agency
regulation" will influence administrative agencies, such as the FDA, to make changes to policy
(Seidenfeld 2009). There is also the belief that support the idea that Supreme Court opinions
influence agency policy changes (Spriggs 1996). Judicial review's purpose is to stop agencies
from attempting to gain power over areas outside of their purpose and prevent them from
creating actions or regulations that are not appropriate to their designation (Seidenfeld 2009).
Because of this, the courts are given the power to use judicial review to check and correct the
changes in policy made by federal agencies, such as the FDA (Crowley 1987; Humphries and
Songer 1999; Seidenfeld 2009).
Since we all now know the FDA drug approval process and the role courts have in legal
drug disputes, the question is if the courts can influence agencies. It has already been established
that the judiciary's majority ideology influences the decisions of the IRS (Howard and Nixon
2003). Howard and Nixon’s study on the IRS and judicial influence found that the IRS
conducted more audits on businesses during a liberal majority in the federal court of appeals, and
more audits on individuals when the federal court of appeals was majority conservative (Howard
and Nixon 2003). This is similar to what one may expect from the relationship between the
courts and the FDA. It may be the case that when the U.S. Courts of Appeals has a liberal
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majority that the FDA increases regulation on drug manufactures to protect the health of
individual drug consumers. It appears that the liberal courts prefer to put less pressure on the
individuals and that conservative courts prefer to free businesses from the burden of too much
oversight.
Some scholars suggest that the Courts are concerned about the direction of policy
(Crowley 1987; Shapiro 1964). Depending on the Court’s ideology, they may seek different
agency decisions and regulation outcomes. If agencies are aware that different court ideologies
want different outcomes, then they might act in favor of the court majority. Agencies do pay
attention to court decisions, and that the “bureaucracies are more likely to implement larger
policy changes when resources favor the Court” (Spriggs 1996). Meaning that federal agencies
like the FDA are more likely to implement changes in favor of the courts' wants. With this in
mind, it is believed “that the courts of appeals are staffed with judges who are policy oriented
and attempt to bring agency policy into line with their own policy preferences, but feel
constrained to pursue their preferences within limits set by the law” (Humphries and Songer
1999). These principle-agent theory findings support my belief that the courts influence the
FDA, and that this influence is based on the courts' political policy preferences. It appears that
the Supreme Court also shifts the Court of Appeals. When the Supreme Court precedent shifts in
a conservative direction, the lower court decisions from both liberal and conservative judges will
also shift in a conservative direction (Humphries and Songer 1999).
The FDA has very little ability to offer redress for private injuries, product liability cases
are reviewed and evaluated by judges and juries (Cooper 1986). To protect citizens from bad or
illegal usage of drugs, the courts are needed. Drug manufacture regulation is complex and
controversial, and drug litigation plays a big role on public health, public law, and private law
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(McCuskey 2018). Different courts want different outcomes, the “Circuit Court of Appeals
cannot even agree on preemption analyses under the applicable Supreme Court precedent”
(McCuskey 2018). How are agencies to act when their courts have different intentions? It is
probably in the FDA’s best interest to act according to the preferences of the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Decreasing regulation and cost of generic drugs has been a recent trend, but economic
drugs come at the cost of safety (McCuskey 2018). The courts can tell the FDA and drug
manufacturers what to do because of judicial review. The courts can prevent agencies from
overstepping their bounds and acting in inappropriate ways according to their original purpose
by using the powers granted to them in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Marbury v.
Madison3 (1803) (Seidenfeld 2009).
2.4

Judicial Ideology and Case Decisions
The judiciary is the third branch of our government, and they are indeed a political

institution. The courts are stacked with judges who have political preferences and policy goals
(Humphries and Songer 1999). Some justices want agencies to be deregulated and the red tape
removed, and these judges would be considered conservative leaning (Garland 1985; Mikva
1986). In contrast, the more liberal judges want more regulation and wish to protect the public
(Ausness 2010; Garland 1985; McCuskey 2018; Mikva 1986). The difference in the wants and
wishes of judges is rooted in their political beliefs and personal biases. Legal academic theorist
are increasingly in favor of the evidence that suggests political affiliation is a motiving factory, if
not the primary, that explains the decisions made by the judiciary (Friedman 2005). The
attitudinal model says that personal political ideology influences and motivates judges to decide
cases as they do. If this is the case, the question is how we expect judges to act, what preferences

3

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 2 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1803).
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do judges have, and how will their political ideology influence the formation of the decisions
they make. However, I do not plan to calculate or explain how much political ideology
influences the decisions of judges. What I wish to explain is how judges of different political
affiliations are likely to decide cases if ideology was the primary motivation for case decisions.
Federal Court of Appeals judges have political preferences, and they will "attempt to
bring agency policy into line with their own policy preferences but feel constrained to pursue
their preferences within limits set by the law" (Humphries and Songer 1999). Individual judges
are also concerned with the direction of policies, and they intend to make decisions that help
produce good law (Crowley 1987; Hausegger and Baum 1999; Shapiro 1964). Good law does
not mean objectively exceptional law; political concerns and policy preferences make this idea of
good law subjective.
This thesis theorizes that the judiciary has an influence over the FDA’s actions, and those
judges have a preference regarding drug law and regulation outcomes based on their ideology
(Crowley 1987; Hausegger and Baum 1999; Shapiro 1964). The decisions of judges become
even more subjective and more closely reflect their ideological preferences as one moves up the
federal judicial hierarchy (Zorn and Bowie 2010). Different ideologies favor different outcomes
for law and policy (Klein and Stern 2004; McCuskey 2018). It is expected that conservative
judges will act on their preferences to decrease regulation and support businesses when making
decisions on drug product liability cases, because Republicans tend to favor economic policy and
less business regulation (Klein and Stern 2004; Pew Research Center 2017). Meaning that
conservative judges are more likely to favor businesses than consumers, and they do not wish for
the FDA to create more regulations, even if there are health concerns. Liberal judges are
predicted to be more likely in favor of increasing regulation, promote consumer protections, and
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influencing the FDA to change regulatory policies that would decrease the chances of bad drugs
making it into the market. This thesis hope to add onto the discussion of ideological decisions
made by judges. No research currently explicitly states the types of decisions judges make based
on their political affiliation. Do Democrat or Republican appointed judges make decisions in
favor of drug consumers more often in pharmaceutical product liability cases? This thesis will
attempt to uncover the answer to that question.
It is reasonable to believe that conservative judges are more likely to support a decrease
in regulation than their liberal counterparts (Pew Research Center 2017). Democrats are more
likely to support an increase in regulation or red tape, especially if it increases pharmaceutical
safety and general welfare (Klein and Stern 2004). An excellent example of a liberal decision is
Wyeth v. Levine. Wyeth v. Levine is a case that was ruled in favor of protecting consumers and
increasing the requirements that pharmaceutical manufacturers must meet when marketing their
drugs to the public. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that federal law and FDA policies do
not restrict or preempt the state laws or requirements (Ausness 2010). Meaning that this Supreme
Court ruling allows states to pass laws or create additional regulations and requirements that are
more restrictive than the current federal FDA regulations and requirements. This was a liberal
decision made to protect consumers and allow increased regulation. The Supreme Court also said
that the FDA “had limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs currently on the market” at that
time (Ausness 2010). Seems like the Court was worried that the FDA had too many drugs and
not enough resources.
Another and later Supreme Court decision came from Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett, and the decision in this case was ruled by a conservative majority. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that additional state regulations and requirements for defect claims
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regarding generic drug warnings and labels put unnecessary pressure on the manufacture and
preempt federal FDA laws and policies (Wolfman and King 2013). The drug that did not meet
state warning label requirements was called Sulindac, and it caused Karen Bartlett to have a
severe drug reaction called Steven-Johnson syndrome, this caused the skin condition toxic
epidermal necrolysis (Wolfman and King 2013). The condition caused permanent and serious
injuries to Karen Bartlett. Yet, the Supreme Court ruled that “generic drug manufactures will not
face liability” if they meet FDA requirements (T. W. Olson 2015). This means that if the FDA
approves of a warning label, then that label is legitimate under federal and state law. This means
that “injured generic drug consumers will remain without any legal remedies” when they are
harmed by these drugs that are approved by the FDA (T. W. Olson 2015).
The FDA may be aware of the court’s inconsistent attitudes regarding drug labeling
regulations, because of the different rulings made by the courts on drug labeling preemption
cases such as Wyeth v. Levine and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (Ausness 2010; T. W.
Olson 2015; Wolfman and King 2013). These rulings show individual accounts of how the
liberal and conservative majorities may not be the same. These cases assist in creating an
assumption that conservative majorities prefer fewer regulations on drug manufacturers and
disapprove of stricter state drug labeling requirements. While liberal majorities prefer more
regulation on drug manufacturers and approve of stricter state drug labeling requirements. When
the courts are conservative there will be less pressure on the FDA to be strict on regulation.
Because of this, one can expect more drug approvals and when the FDA is not pressured to be
strict on regulation by the conservative courts. When the courts are liberal, one can expect more
monitoring, regulation, and fewer drug approvals.
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Conventional wisdom suggests that the political party which appointed the judge
indicates the ideology of said judge, and it is believed that the judge's preferences are not
drastically different from the other branches who share the same identity (Pinello 1999). Which
is why it’s believed that Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett is a good example for how one
may expect a conservative court or justice to rule. The Supreme Court ruled that additional state
regulations and requirements for defect claims regarding generic drug warnings and labels put
unnecessary pressure on manufacturers and preempt federal FDA laws and policies (Wolfman
and King 2013). This is the opposite of the liberal decision made in Wyeth v. Levine. Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett was a 5 to 4 decision where the five justices who ruled in favor of
fewer consumer protections and regulations were all conservative. This conservative majority
decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett is consistent with what one would expect after
learning the opinions of conservatives in the public (Pew Research Center 2017).
The courts are a political independent institutional that uses their powers to exercise party
political preferences. The "most striking evidence of judicial independence is a court's exercise
of the power of judicial review" (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Reviewing agency actions with
judicial review is possible because of the APA. The independent judiciary must hold the FDA
accountable. However, the court views the scientific experience of the FDA as giving the
organization enough merit to be given deference (O’Reilly 2007). The deference given to the
FDA was mainly for the purpose of drug approvals. Of course, the courts do not have the
expertise or time to check if drugs meet the requirements set by the FDA. However, the courts
can do have the resources and expertise to review the legalities of drug labeling issues and
product liability cases. It is when judges make decisions on these topics that they are often
viewed as policymakers (Humphries and Songer 1999). The decisions of these judges often

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

19

result in either more or less pressure on drug manufacturers. As we put less regulatory pressure
on those in the drug industry, we may suffer extreme health loss with increasingly risky drugs
(McCuskey 2018).
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RESEARCH DESCRIPTION

Theory
This thesis theorizes that the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals influence drug

regulatory rule changes made by the FDA. Despite the fact that the FDA is given lots of
deference due to its scientific expertise (O’Reilly 2007). I believe this deference is likely part of
the reason the FDA will follow the courts initiatives. The FDA does not want to lose any of the
autonomy it has gained. Product liability cases typically challenge the drug manufactures, but
they can also challenge regulatory issues like in Wyeth v. Levine and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Bartlett. Some cases may rule against FDA drug regulation and challenge its scientific
authority.
We already know that the U.S. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court both play an
impactful role in influencing tobacco policy and the status quo regarding tobacco regulation (Lax
and McCubbins 2006). The courts can influence drug regulation in a similar manner. Their
authority and power of judicial review allows them to influence policy through common law. I
see no reason to believe the FDA’s drug regulation is any different from tobacco. I also believe
that the U.S. Court of Appeals' influence on the IRS is a good indicator that the courts likely
influence other agencies like the FDA. All the prior research discussed in the literature review
sections influenced my theoretical beliefs. However, my assumptions must still be tested.
It may even be possible to predict how judges of different political affiliations may rule
on cases regarding pharmaceutical product liability. Research suggest that when the median
federal court of appeals judge in any given circuit is conservative, the IRS is more likely to
conduct audits on individual in that region than businesses (Howard and Nixon 2003).
Meanwhile, the opposite is true for when the circuit has a median liberal judge. However, this
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does not directly translate to judicial attitudes toward federal health agencies, like the FDA or
pharmaceutical product liability cases. There is no other literature on this specific research area.
Therefore, I believe we should look at the Supreme Court cases of Wyeth v. Levine and Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett along with public attitudes toward regulation and the FDA.
Recent polls suggest that only 26% of Republicans and 47% of Democrats trust the FDA (The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2021). Other polls suggest that 66% of Democrats believe that
the government should regulate businesses, while only 31% of Republicans believe the same
thing (Pew Research Center 2017). I want to be explicit; I do not think public polling determines
case decisions or FDA policy changes. I simply believe this is an indicator of how different
ideologies feel about regulation, especially regulation done by the FDA.
It is a combination of prior research, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, Wyeth v.
Levine, and current public discourse that motivated me to believe Republican appointed judges
are more likely to rule against additional regulation by health agencies than Democrats. I hope to
discover the answer to judicial influence on the FDA. In doing so, I will understand the different
types of decisions made by judges of different political affiliations regarding pharmaceutical
product liability. I believe that judges of different political affiliations have opposing policy
preferences, and they attempt to make decisions on cases concerning pharmaceutical liability that
move policy toward their preferences.
While I believe that the judiciary plays a very important role in the decision-making
process of FDA drug regulation, others may argue that Congress plays an even more important
role in said process. Congress has oversight over federal agencies. Congress makes and
determines the rules that the FDA follow. Certain Congressional committees have occasionally
had significant influence on the FDA (Shipan 2004). Congress can also use funding as a means
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to persuade the FDA to respond positively to Congress’s preferences (Carpenter et al. 2003;
Hermes 2001). However, Congress typically gives bureaucratic agencies autonomy out of
convenience (Lawson 1994). Under most circumstances the FDA is allowed to act autonomously
without any influence or restrictions from Congress (Shipan 2004). In fact, the FDA is not
influenced by elected politicians directly or linearly in any compacity (Shipan 2004). On the
other hand, the FDA will always have to deal with the Courts and its influence. Research has
already shown that the courts influenced the FDA on tobacco related issues (Lax and McCubbins
2006). I simply want to add drug regulation to existing literature showing how the courts
influence the FDA. I believe the Courts have a greater impact on the FDA than Congress because
of what existing literature suggests. In conjunction with existing literature, I believe the constant
threat of losing autonomy because of court challenges will pose a greater influence on the FDA
than the allowed autonomy by Congress.
The next theoretical question is why I expect the types of decisions to change depending
on ideological majority in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The answer is that I believe judges will
make different decisions based on ideology. The previous paragraph mentioned two Supreme
Court decisions and public polling. The court decisions and polling results suggest the same
thing. Republicans are less likely to favor increased regulation regarding public health. The CDC
has been increasing regulation to fight COVID-19, and those increased regulations have
substantially negatively impacted the percentage of Republicans who trust them. The Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett was ruled primarily by Republican appointed judges, and it
decreased regulation of pharmaceutical drug manufacturers. Lastly, Republicans in general
typically favor increasing regulation less often than Democrats (Pew Research Center 2017).
With that said, I am not arguing that ideology is the only factor determining the decisions of
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judges. There is an enormous amount of literature debating what influences judicial decision
making. While there is lots of debate regarding multiple influences and how much each influence
matters, no literature states that ideology matters none. Some literature has attempted to say
ideology is the only determining factor (Segal and Spaeth 2002). However, that is not the
purpose of this thesis. Nor is this thesis attempting to add much substance to that area of
literature. I simply argue that ideology plays a factor in judicial decision making; thus, we can
expect the majority of decisions to change when the ideological makeup of the courts changes.
Why would anyone hold this belief that the courts can influence the FDA? Many people
don’t believe the courts have much influence on the FDA because of the deference given to them
(O’Reilly 2007). This thesis sets out to demonstrate how the FDA is influenced by the judiciary,
and how different ideological majorities in the courts influence the FDA in different ways. As far
as this thesis is concerned, there is no research showing that the judiciary affects FDA drug
approvals. Despite that, I believe that the U.S. Court of Appeals attempts to influence the FDA
because the judges have policy preferences and setting precedent through pharmaceutical
liability and drug regulation precedent is one avenue to reach their goals. The FDA knows that
the courts precedent carries the same weight as policy. The FDA's scientific authority and
autonomy in drug regulation are not something the administrative agency would want to be
challenged in court. Because if it is, the judges have a chance at their goals being realized
through creating precedent that favors their wants. It is in the FDA’s best interest to make sure
that precedent does not negatively affect them. The FDA can avoid this by shaping their current
policies and goals to match those of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
While there are not any studies like mine, there are many academic articles regarding
drug policy, regulation, laws, and court cases (Ausness 2010; Cooper 1986; McCuskey 2018; T.
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W. Olson 2015; Wolfman and King 2013). There are also many studies that show the judiciary
has influence over federal agencies (Howard and Nixon 2003; Humphries and Songer 1999;
Spriggs 1996). Howard and Nixon did a study to test if the IRS was influenced by the judiciary’s
majority ideology. Howard and Nixon found that the IRS conducted more audits on businesses
during a liberal majority in the federal court of appeals, and more audits on individuals when the
federal court of appeals was majority conservative (Howard and Nixon 2003). If the IRS is
influenced by the judiciary, why would we expect the FDA to be immune of judicial influence?
This supports the belief that the conservative courts will influence bureaucracies in a way that
support businesses. Lax and McCubbins found that the judiciary does “wield decisive power
over tobacco regulation and their decisions had a major impact on the probability that tobacco
would ultimately be regulated by the FDA” (Lax and McCubbins 2006). While this does not
show that the judiciary plays a powerful role in drug regulation, it does show that the judiciary
has the potential ability to influence the FDA when it comes to regulation.
If it is true that the courts influence the FDA, what type of influence would they
have? A conservative judge’s decision is expected to influence the FDA to either decrease or not
change the regulation requirements for drug manufacturers. We can expect higher product output
and economic gains during times of low regulation or consistent regulation without significant
change (Davies 2014; Dufour, Lanoie, and Patry 1998; Loayza 2010). When the courts are
liberal it is expected that the FDA will make regulations concerning drug approvals stricter,
businesses to decrease their drug production output, and for there to be less pressure on the FDA
to approve drugs. Anytime there is an increase in economic gains because of less scrutiny by the
FDA, there is a decrease in consumer safety. Less regulated drugs are more likely to have
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adverse effects on the public who consume drugs made by the pharmaceutical manufacturers
(McCuskey 2018). This may be very important for future research.
The courts have more freedom to operate on their preferences as one moves up the
judicial hierarchy (Zorn and Bowie 2010). While one may not expect much variation in the
district courts, ideology may be a contributing factor to judicial decisions at the appeals level.
The district courts are at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy, and they are supposed to follow the
law without any interpretation. Research on the U.S. District Courts suggest ideology does not
influence decisions at the district court level (Gunderson 2021). The ideology of judges in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals can predict “not only individual judges’ votes but also the votes of their
colleagues” (Harris and Sen 2019). However, literature on the distinction of decisions made by
judges of different ideologies is not exhaustive. This thesis will be adding to the conversation by
stating how liberal and conservative judges typically make decisions regarding pharmaceutical
product liability cases. It will also be adding onto principal-agent theory literature, because this
thesis is discussing if judicial decisions influence the FDA to make policy changes.
This thesis theorizes that drug approvals and regulations are somewhat contingent on the
court’s ideology. Different ideological majorities pressure the FDA in different ways. Liberals
have different preferences than conservatives when it comes to the regulation of businesses and
drugs (Klein and Stern 2004; Pew Research Center 2017). There is no current reason for one to
believe that judges are drastically different from legislatures when it comes to ideological
preferences. The reason the courts make different decisions and have different outcomes is
because of the judge’s ideological differences (McCuskey 2018). Ideological differences are
present in cases favored by the liberals such as Wyeth v. Levine and cases favored by the
conservatives like Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (Ausness 2010; T. W. Olson 2015;
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Spriggs 1996; Wolfman and King 2013). It is likely that the majority Supreme Court and U.S.
Courts of Appeals ideology will influence FDA drug approvals because of these trends in court
influence, ideological differences, and changes in case rulings.
3.2

Hypothesis Section 1
For hypothesis 1 I theorize that Republican appointed judges in the U.S. Court of Appeals

will make decisions that favor businesses more often than Democrat appointed judges. Meaning
that most of the decisions made in favor of drug consumers are by Democrat appointed judges.
The fact that different ideologies favor different policies, laws, and case outcomes has already
been stated. However, it has yet to be discussed that their ideological differences have different
implications. Logically and based on prior research, conservatives favor economic policy and are
less likely to support an increase in regulation (Klein and Stern 2004; Pew Research Center
2017). Democrats are measured to support increasing regulation for the purpose of having better
pharmaceutical safety control than Republicans (Klein and Stern 2004). Hypothesis 2 is that
when most U.S. Court of Appeals decisions favor businesses more than consumers in
pharmaceutical drug liability cases within any given year, the FDA will follow the courts'
decisions by reducing regulatory requirements. Hypothesis 2 is also true if the FDA makes
decisions that increase regulation when the U.S. Court of Appeals makes decisions primarily in
favor of drug consumers. With that being said, less drug approvals due to higher regulation
promotes general welfare and individual safety (McCuskey 2018). The quantity and regulation of
drugs is likely to influence many things that impact the public, such as price and ease of access. I
believe finding the answers these hypotheses would not only contribute to current principal-agent
theory literature, but also contribute to public discourse.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

27

What does less regulation do exactly? An increase in regulation can lower product output
and economic gains (Davies 2014; Dufour, Lanoie, and Patry 1998; Loayza 2010). Hypothesis 3
is that when the FDA reduces regulation, there will be an increase in the overall number of
annual drug approvals. Thus, when the FDA increases regulation there will be a reduction in the
overall number of annual drug approvals. When the courts want to decrease regulatory pressures,
we expect FDA policy changes to make regulations concerning drug approvals less strict. This
decrease in scrutiny toward businesses will increase drug production output. Because of this, the
FDA will increase the number of approved drugs completed annually.
There is no research or literature that shows how conservative or liberal judges usually
rule on cases of product liability. While Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and conservative
attitudes toward regulation support the assumptions made in this thesis, they are not definitive. It
could be the case that conservative and liberal judges feel very similar regarding pharmaceutical
product liability. A case decided in 2019 called Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht4 is
viewed as a “positive step for consumer safety; provides a clear, administrable bright line for
lower courts; and is not unreasonably broad” (Lindenfeld 2020). This case was a unanimous
decision in judgment, and a six to three decision in reasoning. The three justices who did not
agree were all Republican appointed judges. It may very well be that judges of different
ideologies want the same outcome, but they have different beliefs on how to get there. We do not
know the answer to this question, nor do we know the answer regarding influence on the FDA.
3.3

Hypothesis Section 2
My hypothesis 4 is that when the U.S. Court of Appeals is primarily Democrat there will

be a decrease in drug approvals for the following year. Hypothesis 4 still stands if drug approvals

4

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 587 U.S., 203 L. Ed. 2d 822 (2019).
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increase when there is not a Democratic majority party affiliation in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Drug approval will be acting as a proxy for changes in regulation. An increase in regulatory
requirements typically increase the cost of producing and inspecting drugs, and this increases the
average time taken to develop and approve drugs (Ward 1992). This means that the dependent
variable will be annual FDA drug approvals (U.S. Food and Drug Administration n.d.). Funding
is a known influence of FDA efficiency and must be a controlled variable (Bureau of the Budget
and Office of Management and Budget n.d.; Carpenter et al. 2003). Because all funding is
allocated by Congress, we must control for Congress’s majority political affiliation.
It is likely that the FDA will react to court decisions. Research has shown instances of
how judicial decisions influence federal agencies like the IRS (Howard and Nixon 2003).
Judicial ideology and decisions made by judges are often complimented by IRS policy changes
(Chow et al. 2020). Corporations are aware of how the ideology of judges can influence
decisions, so many of them “engage in forum shopping in tax litigations to avoid liberal judges”
(Chow et al. 2020). There is lots of literature regarding how ideology influences the decisions of
judges in tax litigation, and how the judiciary influences the IRS. However, there is not similar
research regarding pharmaceutical products liability and the FDA. This thesis will light the
torches for similar research and discussion with a focus on the FDA.
3.4

Methods Section 1
The first analysis is a simple 2 test. This test’s purpose is to analyze policy changes

more closely. We are analyzing the years 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016. These are all years under
the Obama presidency. President Obama did not appoint enough justices to the U.S. Court of
Appeals to shift it from Republican dominated to Democrat until 2014. I believe analyzing the
courts under a single presidency strengthens any conclusions that can be drawn about the U.S.
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Court of Appeals. The dependent variable in this analysis is case decisions regarding
pharmaceutical product liability. Case decisions will fall into one of two categories. Category
one is case decisions that favor drug manufacturers, and this category is labeled as business. The
second category is labeled as consumer, because it is populated with case decisions that favor the
plaintiff and drug consumers. Pharmaceutical product liability cases are analyzed using WestLaw
(Thomson Reuters n.d.).
The independent variable is the majority party affiliation of the panel of judges. The
political affiliation of judges will need to be determined using CourtListener (Free Law Project
n.d.). When two of the three judges on a panel are affiliated with the same party on any given
decision, that decision is coded as the majority party. This 2 test will tell us which party
affiliation is more likely to make decisions that favor consumers and businesses. Therefore, the
2 test will test hypotheses 1.
Determining if changes in regulation are influenced by the U.S. Court of Appeals is the
entire purpose of this research. To determine the answer for hypothesis 2, we must know if the
FDA increases regulation when the U.S. Court of Appeals signals that we should support drug
consumers more. The opposite is also at question, does the FDA decrease regulation when the
U.S. Court of Appeals believes that we are imposing too much regulatory requirements on
manufactures? Answering this principle-agent question is the primary goal of this thesis.
However, learning what types of decisions judges make based on party affiliation regarding
pharmaceutical product liability cases is something that we can answer without impeding on the
time and resources required to produce this thesis.
I will compare the party affiliation of judges to the types of decisions made each year. If
in 2010 majority of decisions favored businesses, then I would expect a majority of policy
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decisions to also favor business. Rules or policies that favor businesses would decrease
regulatory requirements, allow the use of chemicals that were previously deemed unsafe, or
something of that nature. All FDA policy changes are tracked using the Federal Register (U.S.
Federal Register n.d.). Using the Federal Register one can note if the FDA made policy changes
in favor of businesses or for public health and safety. After, we will know if most rule change
proposals were in favor of or against the majority of decisions made by the U.S. Court of
Appeals each year. There are typically not many regulatory changes made from year to year
regarding drug regulation. There are approximately 5 to 10 relevant rule changes or proposals
made a year. We will then analyze the drug approval changes of the following year to see if the
regulatory changes influence approvals. This test will answer hypothesis 3, and this is important
because the second analysis assumes that drug approvals are influenced by changes in regulation.
I will discuss the logic and relevancy of these rule changes in accordance with the decisions
made by the U.S. Court of Appeals and change in rate of drug approvals. Analyzing these policy
changes logically will either compliment or critique the findings of the second analysis.
3.5

Methods Section 2
For the second analysis we will use a time series analysis from the year 1940 until the

year 1990. This second analysis will be testing hypothesis 4. The time series analysis will cover
all presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush. Reading all FDA policy
changes from the year 1940 to 1990 would take longer than the timeframe I’ve been allotted;
thus, meaning that I do not have the resources to create a comprehensive dataset of FDA policy
changes. However, I can use drug approvals to access the impact of drug regulation changes.
Studies show that regulation increases can cause the average time taken to develop and approve
drugs to be delayed (Ward 1992). Because of this research, it can be expected as regulation goes
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up there will be less drug approvals. Also meaning that as regulation goes down, we can expect
an increase in drug approvals. Thus, NDA approvals can be treated as a proxy for regulatory
change. Overall annual drug approvals are the dependent variable. Monthly drug approvals are
made public on the FDA’s website (U.S. Food and Drug Administration n.d.). All independent
and controlled variables are lagged because we believe the FDA is influenced by the previous
year’s pharmaceutical liability case decisions. After the previous year’s decisions are made, the
FDA will purpose a rule regulatory change that will impact overall drug approvals.
This brings us to the main independent variable. The independent variable is the U.S.
Appeals majority party affiliation annually. The U.S. Appeals party affiliation majority was
calculated similarly as traditionally done for Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead of
using people, we used the common space scores of each circuit to determine when each
individual circuit is primarily liberal or conservative. The common space scores come from the
data provided in Lee Epstein’s Judicial Common Space (Epstein et al. 2007). These scores are
then replaced with party affiliation. Conservative scores are replaced with Republican, and
liberal is replaced with Democrat. Each year, prior to 1981, when 6 or more circuits are
Republican that year is coded as Republican. The same is true for Democrat. After the 11th
circuit was created in 1981 the number needed to make a majority changed from 6 to 7. Party
affiliation is coded as 1 being a Democrat majority and 0 being a non-Democrat majority. In all
instances of 0 except for 1985, this means that the majority party affiliation of the U.S. Court of
Appeals was Republican. The year 1985 was split perfectly in half between Republicans and
Democrats.
There are multiple controlling variables. There is reason to believe that funding may also
influence the FDA’s drug approval rate (Carpenter et al. 2003). Because of funding’s potential
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influence in FDA drug approvals, funding is a controlled variable. All data regarding funding
comes from Fraser and the federal annual budget (Bureau of the Budget and Office of
Management and Budget n.d.). Because the federal budget is being used, congressional party
affiliation must also be a controlled variable. Congress was separated by chamber. Rather than
have a single congress variable, there is a House and Senate variable. There is research showing
that the President has the ability to influence multiple administrative agencies (Clinton, Lewis,
and Selin 2014; Howell and Lewis 2002). The president has influence over the federal budget
and appoints officials to the FDA (Furlong 1998). Because of this, we must also control for
Presidential influence in the same manner we are controlling for congress. Lastly, I am
controlling for the Supreme Court as it is the highest court and has more authority than the U.S.
Court of Appeals.
A time series analysis would allow us to record and track each year’s party majority, drug
approvals, and FDA funding. If FDA drug approvals rise under a Republican majority and fall
under a Democrat majority, then there may be a link between the two. What could harm this
possible link is if FDA funding and drug approvals increase and decrease at the same or similar
times. A time series analysis makes tracking this easy because the annual data could easily be
tested, viewed, and put onto a table. We could track to see if the changes are consistent or
random. Hypothesis 4 would fail if party affiliation were random and not consistent with changes
in drug approval rates. Because hypothesis 4 is only concerned with how party affiliation
influences FDA drug approvals. Variable data points that do not fluctuate at the same rate as the
dependent variable do not likely have a large impact on the dependent variable. The dependent
variable data points are based on the overall annual NDA approvals completed by the FDA.
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Dependent Variable (DV)

Overall annual drug approvals

Democrat Appeals Court (Lagged
Independent Variable)

Annual Majority of Circuits are
run by Democrat Appointed
Judges
1= Democrat
Annual Federal Budget
appropriations for FDA

FDA Appropriations (Lagged
Independent Variable)
Democrat Senate (Lagged
Independent Variable)
Democrat House (Lagged
Independent Variable)

Annual Democrat Majority runs
Senate
1 = Democrat
Annual Democrat Majority runs
House of Representatives
1 = Democrat

Democrat President (Lagged
Independent Variable)

Annual Democrat acting as
President
1 = Democrat

Democrat Supreme Court
(Lagged Independent Variable)

Annual Majority of Supreme
Court Judges are Democrat
Appointed
1 = Democrat

Lagged Dependent Variable (DV)

Overall annual drug approval
delayed by a year and treated as
an independent variable
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4.1

FINDINGS

Test and Results Section 1
As predicted, most judges in 2010 and 2011 were Republican appointed, and in 2015 and

2016 a majority were Democrat appointed. Table 2 shows that over 70% of decisions were in
favor of businesses for both 2010 and 2011. Approximately 87% of Republican appointed judges
favored pharmaceutical manufacturers than consumers during that two-year period. Meanwhile,
approximately 44% of Democrat appointed judges favored the business during 2010 and 2011.
There may be an argument that Democrats are neutral, but it would not be safe to assume that is
the case. I also gathered circuit data to create figure 1 showing what percentage of decisions
were made in each circuit regarding the total number of pharmaceutical liability cases. I found
that no single circuit saw more than a quarter of the total pharmaceutical liability cases gathered.
The goal of testing hypothesis 1 is not to determine a measurement for when ideology or party
affiliation matters. The goal was to determine what party affiliation primarily rules in favor of
pharmaceutical manufactures or consumers. The goal of hypothesis 2 is to analyze if the FDA
responds to either majority by influencing the agencies to change their rules to favor the
perspective and decisions made by the courts. Since majority of decisions were made in favor of
the business, we should expect the FDA to decrease regulation.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Cases Decided in Each Circuit

Table 3 shows that the FDA proposed rule changes that made their regulations easier to
follow, extended application dates, and increased the approval of drugs (U.S. Federal Register
n.d.). There were six proposed rule changes in 2010 by the FDA that would affect
pharmaceutical manufactures. The FDA made a rule change that allows the use of chemicals not
previously allowed without essential-use designations (U.S. Food and Drug Administration
2010d). Benzoyl peroxide was also recognized as safe and effective by the FDA in 2010 (U.S.
Food and Drug Administration 2010a). The FDA also increased the number of over-the-counter
drugs available for human use (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2010a). There was a change
made to decrease the “ambiguity in the current reporting scheme” that has “caused confusion
among sponsors” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2010b). Three changes were made to
increase clarity in the FDA’s drug regulations and requirements (U.S. Federal Register n.d.).
Those three changes made it easier for businesses to accurately follow regulations. The changes
did not significantly increase any procedural requirements. Pharmaceutical manufacturers did not
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have to adapt to any changes or put in more effort to ensure the safety of their drugs. One rule
change was made to reduce biologics regulations because the regulations were “too prescriptive
and unnecessarily restrictive” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2010c). In 2010 the FDA
decreased regulation, increased use of chemicals in the production of drugs, and increased
regulation clarity. These changes have allowed more flexibility and eased production. In 2011
there was a 20% increase in drug approvals from the previous year (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration n.d.). As scrutiny toward drug manufacturers decreased, NDA approvals
increased. This answer is the goal of hypothesis 3; however, we must analyze the nonRepublican majority years before any hypotheses can find support.
Table 2: 2010 and 2011 2 Analysis
2010 & 2011
Decision Favored
Business

Consumer

Democrat Appointed Judge

11

14

25

Republican Appointed
Judge
Total

47

7

54

58

21

79

Pearson  = 16. 22

Probability = 0.00

2

Total

We saw slightly different results in 2011. There were twelve rule changes either proposed
or finalized in 2011 that were relevant to pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, most of these
rule changes were about committees, change in address for certain FDA facilities, and
announcement of name changes for certain offices. There was also a mix of changes favoring
consumers and businesses. As shown in table 3, there was exactly one more rule change in favor
of easing requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers than increasing them. Because of this,
we should only expect a small increase in annual drug approvals. In 2012 we got exactly that,
there was only an increase in drug approvals by 4%. The findings for both 2010 and 2011
support the idea that Wyeth v. Levine and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett are indeed good
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examples of how judges rule based on ideology. However, hypotheses two and three cannot find
support until we analyze the assumed Democrat majority years 2015 and 2016.
Table 3: FDA Rule changes and Effects on Businesses
Rule Year and Citation
2010a - 75 FR 9767
2010b - 75 FR 7412
2010c - 75 FR 15639
2010d - 75 FR 19213
2011 - 76 FR 7743
2011 - 76 FR 44475
2011 - 76 FR 13880
2011 - 76 FR 12916
2011 - 76 FR 12847
2015a - 80 FR 55237
2015b - 80 FR 57756
2015c - 80 FR 50762
2015 - 80 FR 38915
2015 - 80 FR 25165
2016 - 81 FR 69668
2016 - 81 FR 61106
2016 - 81 FR 74298
2016 - 81 FR 92603
2016 - 81 FR 81685
2016 - 81 FR 85854
2016 - 81 FR 40512

Scrutiny Toward Businesses
 Decreased
- Neutral
 Decreased
 Decreased
 Increased
 Increased
 Decreased
 Decreased
 Decreased
 Increased
 Increased
 Decreased
 Increased
- Neutral
 Increased
 Increased
 Increased
 Increased
 Increased
- Neutral
 Decreased

The years 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016 support hypotheses 1. A panel is more likely to
rule in favor of the consumer when majority are appointed by Democrats. Seventy-nine percent
of all decisions made in favor of the consumer were made by a majority Democrat panel of
judges. Fifty-nine percent of all cases were there were a Democrat majority went in favor of the
consumer as well. Meaning that anytime there is a pharmaceutical products liability case you are
more likely to be favored as a plaintiff if the majority party affiliation of the U.S. Appeals panel
is Democrat. This knowledge may allow pharmaceutical manufacturers to forum shop to avoid
more Democratic or liberal courts. Corporations already forum shop to avoid liberal judges in tax
litigation cases (Chow et al. 2020).
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Table 4: 2015 and 2016 2 Analysis
2015 & 2016
Decision Favored
Business

Consumer

Democrat Appointed Judge

10

16

26

Republican Appointed
Judge
Total

19

1

20

29

17

46

Pearson 2 = 15. 51

Probability = 0.00

Total

The most interesting outcome of the Democrat majority years of 2015 and 2016 is that
the FDA primarily increased regulation even though most decisions were made in favor of
businesses. Meaning that hypothesis 2 does not find support. Instead of the FDA decreasing
regulation when most decisions favor businesses, they reduced regulation when most decisions
were made by a Democrat-appointed panel of judges. Hypothesis 2 tested if case decisions
influenced regulation, but the results suggest that the political make-up of the courts matter more
than case decisions.
In table 4 approximately sixty-three percent of cases favored pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Yet, in 2015 there were nine relevant proposed or final rule changes that could
have an influence on pharmaceutical drug manufactures. One of these changes were
clarifications to previous rule changes, one was a change in office names, and one was the
termination of an advisory committee. Of the remaining six changes, only one was in favor of
drug manufacturers. That one rule change was regarding color additives in coating formulations
applied to dietary supplements and drug tablets and capsules being allowed (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration 2015c). The remaining five promoted public health and the safety of drug
consumers. Meaning that the FDA increased regulatory requirements even though majority of
case decisions did not favor the plaintiff or drug consumer. There are three notable rule changes.
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One of them is the destruction of drugs no longer deemed safe or refused admission into the
United States to increase the “integrity of the drug supply chain” and “allow FDA to better
protect the public health” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2015a). Secondly, there was a
rule change that over-the-counter antiseptics with antimicrobial properties are subject to
additional research and clinical simulation studies before it is deemed safe and effective. Lastly,
is the inclusion of all products made or derived from tobacco “intended for human consumption
will be subject to regulation as a drug, device, or a combination product under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2015b). This rule change
amended the definition of tobacco product to expand the FDA’s control over tobacco-based
products. This allows the FDA to take action in regards to “products made or derived from
tobacco that were marketed with claims of therapeutic benefit but that did not have approved
new drug applications” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2015b). Theoretically, we should
expect this to increase the number of annual NDA approvals. However, that does not seem to be
the immediate effect. Following the increased regulatory requirements of 2015, we have a
fourteen percent decrease in drug approvals in 2016.
The year 2016 was very similar to 2015. There were roughly 10 relevant policy changes.
There were the usual annual clarifications and changes to committees. Then there were three
decisions that recused regulatory requirements. The remaining 6 were all increasing regulatory
requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers and expanding FDA oversight. In 2017 there was
a twenty-two percent decrease in overall drug approvals. Therefore, hypothesis 3 finds support
from both 2 test. However, hypothesis 2 does not find support. In our analysis, the FDA
increases regulatory requirements when there is a Democrat appointed majority in the courts.
Despite this, I believe the results we found are important to the discussion at hand. Despite if a
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majority of decisions favor pharmaceutical manufacturers, the FDA is more likely to increase
regulations under a Democratic majority. The FDA is also more likely to reduce regulatory
requirements when there is a Republican majority in the U.S. Court of Appeals. According to the
results we found, the political make-up of the courts matters more than the case decisions.
However, more testing would need to be done before we can confidently make that claim. As
seen in table 2, the case decisions made in 2010 and 2011 were primarily made by Republicans
and they primarily favored businesses. Despite 2015 and 2016 being Democratic majority years,
table 4 shows that case decisions primarily favored businesses. We need to test years where most
cases favor the plaintiff but have different political affiliation majorities.
4.2

Testing and Results Section 2
Hypothesis 4 has mixed results. Hypothesis 4 states that when the U.S. Court of Appeals

is primarily Democrat there is a decrease in drug approvals for the following year. This is to test
my assumption that Democrat appointed judges favor consumers in product liability cases more
often than businesses. Favoring consumers more often would imply to the FDA that the courts
want to promote public safety and therefore increase regulation to uphold public health. Thus,
passing rules that would increase regulation and decrease annual NDA approvals. Annual drug
approval is the dependent variable being analyzed in this analysis. Annual drug approvals as a
proxy for FDA regulatory change is assumed because we already know from the previous
analysis and research that an increase in regulatory requirements decreases production and
increases the average time taken to process a drug approval (Ward 1992). The results for
hypothesis 2 suggest that hypothesis 4 will find support. The first time series analysis supports
hypothesis 4.
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Table 5: Time Series Analysis with Lagged Independent Variables
Democrat Appeals Court
FDA Appropriations
Democrat Senate
Democrat House
Democrat President
Democrat SC
Constant
N = 50

Coefficient
-624.65
501.13
-1767.51
1321.22
312.27
-311.22
-6976.81
R2 = 0.76

Standard Error
336.14
109.53
422.91
636.85
302.63
440.35
2016.88
Adjusted R2 = 0.72

P Value
0.07
0
0
0.04
0.31
0.48
0.001
F=0

The results show that when the U.S. Court of Appeals is primarily filled with Democrat
appointed judges there is a decrease in drug approvals in the following year. This test supports
hypothesis 4. However, this model does not account for possible autocorrelation due to the lack
of a lagged dependent variable. A lagged variable for annual drug approvals is added to the
analysis and shown in table 6. The table utilizes a time series analysis test using Huber-White
robust standard errors with a lagged dependent variable for autocorrelation. This test appears to
show a weak and not significant correlation between drug approvals and the majority political
affiliation of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The first table only represented 75% of the variation in
the overall sample, but the second test represents nearly 95% of the sample. While hypothesis 4
may no longer be able to find significant support, these results may still support my theoretical
argument. Because table 5 and the findings of hypothesis 2 both found similar results that
support hypothesis 4.
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Table 6: Duplicate Time Series Analysis with Lagged Dependent Variable
Democrat Appeals Court
FDA Appropriations
Democrat Senate
Democrat House
Democrat President
Democrat SC
Lagged DV
Constant
N = 50

Coefficient
260.89
56.71
-227.48
180.4
84.7
-296.22
.88
-882.98
R2 = 0.95

Standard Error
175.74
63.65
237.76
317.22
145.21
209.54
.07
1082.64
Adjusted R2 = 0.94

P Value
0.15
0.38
0.34
0.57
0.56
0.17
0.00
0.42
F=0

This thesis is unable to claim that the FDA’s drug regulatory changes are influenced by the
majority political affiliation of the courts. However, it is also unable to claim that the political
affiliation of the courts does not matter to the FDA when they are making regulatory changes.
The findings of hypotheses 2 and 4 conflict with each other. The analyses ran in this thesis need
to be rethought and reran in a different manner. The sample size likely needs to be increased
from 50, because the lagged dependent variable has too much impact on all variables. Even
variables founded in prior research, such as the funding variable. Ultimately, the findings of
hypotheses 2 and 4 have opened more questions than answers. Further research on this topic will
need to be complete before a conclusion can be drawn regarding the U.S. Court of Appeals
influence on FDA drug regulation.
4.3

Conclusion and Discussion
Ultimately, we cannot confidently say that the U.S. Court of Appeals influences FDA

drug rules or NDA approvals. We can claim that Republican appointed judges rule in favor of
pharmaceutical manufactures more often than Democrat appointed judges. The Republicanappointed judges create precedent that increase business protections and leave drug consumer
“without any legal remedies” when they are harmed by pharmaceutical manufactures (T. W.
Olson 2015). The same would be true regarding the fact that Democrat appointed judges rule in
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favor of drug consumers more often than Republican appointed judges. It also seems that drug
approvals increase when the FDA is being less stringent. When the FDA makes rule changes that
increase regulation regarding drugs there are fewer NDA approvals the following year. However,
the cause of these rule changes is not apparent. Table 6 failed to show that political affiliation
influenced drug approvals. However, table 5 and the findings of hypothesis 2 suggest that
political affiliation of the U.S. Court of Appeals does influence drug approvals and regulation.
Despite this, my thesis fails to show that either U.S. Court of Appeal pharmaceutical liability
cases or political affiliation influenced rule changes made by the FDA. Because of this, we
cannot answer why the FDA proposed these rule changes when they did. Future research should
attempt to answer this question. We can only conclude that hypotheses 1 and 3 are likely true.
The courts are divided by ideology on their opinions regarding pharmaceutical product
liability and drug regulation. That was the finding of hypothesis 1. The judicial branch of
government is an independent political institution, and the judges seated in the upper hierarchy
of this institution often use their personal ideology when making case decisions (Friedman 2005;
Segal and Spaeth 2002; Zorn and Bowie 2010). The courts are stacked with judges who have
political preferences and policy goals (Humphries and Songer 1999). Judges often disagree and
make different decisions, this division is due to their ideological differences (Humphries and
Songer 1999; Pinello 1999). Despite the ideology of judges, both conservative and liberal judges
influence federal agencies. Howard and Nixon demonstrated how different ideologies in the
courts influence the IRS to make different decisions regarding audits (Howard and Nixon 2003).
The research demonstrated in this thesis has attempted to come to a similar conclusion regarding
the FDA.
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Decreasing the cost of drugs and reforming how pharmaceutical institutions price drugs is
currently a huge debate (Igoe 2020; Sachs 2020; Waxman 2019). Drug safety has been a longstanding concern of the public (Olsen and Whalen 2009). American society seems to be
becoming increasingly divided on topics of healthcare, drugs, and health related bureaucracies.
Healthcare, Covid-19, and drug safety are all topics of importance in recent (Gallup n.d.; Mithani
et al. 2022; Olsen and Whalen 2009). According to the finding of hypothesis three, drug approval
decreases as the FDA increases regulation. The results of hypothesis 2 suggest that regulation
increases when majority of pharmaceutical liability cases are decided by Democrats. However,
maybe the public has nothing to worry about regarding the FDA. I was unable to establish a
statistically causal link. There are also opposing theories that believe health related agencies are
becoming increasingly autonomous (Cuéllar 2014). It seems that this opinion is in the minority,
but it is worth considering. Some legal scholars agree with the Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett ruling and state that it is not the purpose of courts to make health regulation decisions for
agencies. They instead believe that Congress should improve the funding of the FDA and give
them the resources they need to remedy issues (Schuck 2008). Schuck argues that society is more
interested in getting good drugs approved than preventing bad drugs from entering the market. It
is not apparent that Shuck’s arguments are true today, especially given the current vaccine
hesitation for COVID-19 (Sallam 2021).
This thesis and its research hoped to contribute to the literature of principle-agent theory
and how ideology influences judicial decision making. Future research should expand on the
FDA and judicial relationship presented in this thesis. Especially given the fact that this thesis
has serious limitations and mixed results. The sample size of my time series analysis should be
increased from 50 to 70 years. The ideology of the FDA itself is also of concern and should be
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further evaluated. Agencies do have their own interest (Yolles 2019). Knowing how the ideology
of the FDA changes annually would allow future research to track changes more easily in
regulation policy, track ideological influences of the FDA on itself, and many other avenues of
research. If the ideology of the FDA was used in this research, this thesis would have tested the
FDA’s ideology as another independent variable. I would assume the FDA and U.S. Court of
Appeals have similar wants when their political affiliation is the same.
I wanted to know if FDA rule changes are influenced by the ideology of judges.
Ultimately, answering that question was one of the original goals I had when developing this
thesis. Unfortunately, it has been neither answered nor disproven. First, the test gave mixed
results. Secondly, the analysis did not directly test ideological influence on regulation. Doing
another time series analysis is required. Instead of the dependent variable being annual drug
approvals it should be annual policy changes. The policy changes should then be coded to either
primarily favor businesses or consumers. Possibly, a score or measurement could even be made
to replace dummy type variables. In addition to this, more recent years should be tested. My time
series analysis included years where Southern Democrats still had some influence in politics and
government. Meaning that my party affiliation test may be flawed. If unable to complete a test
using more recent years, then it would be best to replace party affiliation with ideological scores
or measurements instead.
Federal agencies like the FDA can be influenced by funding and governmental
institutions (Carpenter et al. 2003; Clinton, Lewis, and Selin 2014; Howell and Lewis 2002;
Shipan 2004). The courts are likely concerned about policy outcomes, and they have the ability
to review agency actions (Crowley 1987; Humphries and Songer 1999; Shapiro 1964). Agencies
like the FDA will likely implement changes when the resources or purpose favor the Courts
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(Spriggs 1996). Meaning that the FDA will change policies when they know the courts are not
likely to disagree. The findings of hypothesis two suggest the courts increased regulation when
there was a Democrat majority in the U.S. Court of Appeals. Table 5 of hypothesis 4 showed that
NDA approvals decreased under a Democrat majority as well. The findings of hypothesis 3
support research that suggest regulation influences drug approvals. The FDA has to rely on the
courts to give redress for those who are negatively impacted by drug manufacturers (Cooper
1986). The outcome of these cases may depend on the ideology of the courts. The results of
hypothesis 1 suggest that Democrats rule in favor of the plaintiff more often than Republicans in
pharmaceutical product liability cases. This is consistent with the fact different courts cannot
even agree on the way preemption should be analyzed (McCuskey 2018). In Wyeth v. Levine, the
liberal majority ruled that states are allowed to add their own safety regulations in addition to
federal FDA regulations (Ausness 2010). While Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, with a
conservative majority, ruled that the federal FDA regulations are sufficient enough and can give
liability protections to drug manufactures (T. W. Olson 2015; Wolfman and King 2013). These
assumptions found partial support from the research produced in this study. However, the
ultimate goal of this thesis was not met. Table 5 of hypothesis 4 and the findings of hypothesis 2
found similar results, yet table 6 of hypothesis 4 contradicts those results. Further examination is
required before we can truly know if the U.S. Court of Appeals plays a role in FDA drug
regulation.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

47
REFERENCES

Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2021. “Public Trust in CDC, FDA, and Fauci Holds Steady,
Survey Shows.” https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/public-trust-in-cdc-fdaand-fauci-holds-steady-survey-shows/.
Ausness, Richard C. 2010. “The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of Prescription
Drugs.” Food & Drug LJ 65: 247.
Braman, Eileen, and Beth Easter. 2014. “Normative Legitimacy: Rules of Appropriateness in
Citizens’ Assessments of Individual Judicial Decisions.” Justice System Journal 35(3):
239–68.
Bureau of the Budget, and Office of Management and Budget. “Budget of the United States
Government (1921-2021).” https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/budget-united-statesgovernment-54?browse=1930s (December 16, 2021).
Carpenter, Daniel, Michael Chernew, Dean G. Smith, and A. Mark Fendrick. 2003. “Approval
Times For New Drugs: Does The Source Of Funding For FDA Staff Matter? The
Amount of Resources Devoted to FDA Review, Not the Source of Funding, Was Likely
the Principal Driver behind Shrinking Approval Times since 1980.” Health Affairs
22(Suppl1): W3-618-W3-624.
Chow, Travis, Allen Huang, Kai Wai Hui, and Terry J. Shevlin. 2020. “Judge Ideology and
Corporate Tax Planning.” Available at SSRN 3513154.
Clinton, Joshua D., David E. Lewis, and Jennifer L. Selin. 2014. “Influencing the Bureaucracy:
The Irony of Congressional Oversight.” American Journal of Political Science 58(2):
387–401.
Cook, Kathryn. 2001. “The Presidential FDA: Politics Meet Science.”
Cooper, Richard M. 1986. “Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and
Drug Administration.” Food, Drug, Cosmetic Law Journal 41(3): 233–40.
Crowley, Donald W. 1987. “Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of
Agency Matter?” Western Political Quarterly 40(2): 265–83.
Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino. 2014. “Modeling Partial Agency Autonomy in Public-Health
Policymaking.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 15(2): 471–506.
Davies, Antony. 2014. “Regulation and Productivity.” Mercatus Research. Mercatus Center at
George Mason University. Available online: http://mercatus. org/publication/regulationan d-productivity.
Davis, Mary J. 2007. “The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA.”
BCL Rev. 48: 1089.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

48

Dufour, Charles, Paul Lanoie, and Michel Patry. 1998. “Regulation and Productivity.” Journal of
Productivity Analysis 9(3): 233–47.
Epstein, Lee, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2007. “The Judicial
Common Space.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(2): 303–25.
Free Law Project. “CourtListener.” Court Listener. https://www.courtlistener.com.
Friedman, Barry. 2005. “The Politics of Judicial Review.” Tex. L. Rev. 84: 257.
Furlong, Scott R. 1998. “Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks.”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8(1): 39–65.
Gallup. “Healthcare System.” Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-system.aspx.
Garland, Merrick B. 1985. “Deregulation and Judicial Review.” Harvard Law Review: 505–91.
Gunderson, Anna. 2021. “Ideology, Disadvantage, and Federal District Court Inmate Civil
Rights Filings: The Troubling Effects of Pro Se Status.” Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 18(3): 603–28.
Harris, Allison P., and Maya Sen. 2019. “Bias and Judging.” Annual Review of Political Science
22: 241–59.
Hausegger, Lori, and Lawrence Baum. 1999. “Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation.” American Journal of Political
Science: 162–85.
Hermes, Clinton. 2001. “Political Science and the FDA.”
Howard, Robert M., and David C. Nixon. 2003. “Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal
Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service.” Wash. UJL & Pol’y 13:
233.
Howard, Robert M., and Amy Steigerwalt. 2012. Judging Law and Policy: Courts and
Policymaking in the American Political System. Routledge.
Howell, William G., and David E. Lewis. 2002. “Agencies by Presidential Design.” The Journal
of Politics 64(4): 1095–1114.
Humphries, Martha Anne, and Donald R. Songer. 1999. “Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight
of Federal Administrative Agencies.” The Journal of Politics 61(1): 207–20.
Igoe, Katherine. 2020. “Putting the Drug Debate into Context: The State of Pharmaceutical Cost
Reform in the U.S.” Harvard T.H. Chan. https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/state-ofpharmaceutical-cost-reform-in-the-us/.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

49

Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern. 2004. “Democrats and Republicans in Anthropology and
Sociology: How Do They Differ on Public Policy Issues?” The American Sociologist
35(4): 79–86.
Lawson, Gary. 1994. “The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State.” Harvard Law Review
107(6): 1231–54.
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. “Courts Congress, and Public Policy, Part i:
The Fda, the Courts, and the Regulation of Tobacco.” J. Contemp. Legal Issues 15: 163.
Lindenfeld, Eric. 2020. “Clear Evidence Clarified.” Food & Drug LJ 75: 346.
Lindenfeld, Eric, and Jasper L. Tran. 2015. “Beyond Preemption of Generic Drug Claims.” Sw.
L. Rev. 45: 241.
Loayza, Norman V. 2010. Business Regulation and Economic Performance. World Bank
Publications.
Masters, Diana J. 2014. “Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and the Demise of Recovery for
Consumers of Generic Drugs.” Loy. L. Rev. 60: 399.
McCuskey, Elizabeth Y. 2018. “On Drugs: Preemption, Presumption, and Remedy.” Journal of
Legal Medicine 38(3–4): 365–85.
Mikva, Abner J. 1986. “The Changing Role of Judicial Review.” Administrative Law Review:
115–40.
Mithani, Jasmine, Aaron Bycoffe, Christopher Groskopf, and Dhrumil Mehta. 2022. “How
Americans View Biden’s Response To The Coronavirus Crisis.” FiveThirtyEight.
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/coronavirus-polls/.
Olsen, Axel K., and Matthew D. Whalen. 2009. “Public Perceptions of the Pharmaceutical
Industry and Drug Safety.” Drug safety 32(10): 805–10.
Olson, Mary K. 1995. “Regulatory Agency Discretion among Competing Industries: Inside the
FDA.” JL Econ. & Org. 11: 379.
———. 2004. “Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review.”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 29(3): 397–430.
Olson, Tyler W. 2015. “Supreme Court’s Overreaching Preemption Interpretation and Its
Consequences: Granting Generic Drug Manufacturers Legal Immunity through the Duty
of Sameness in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and PLIVA v. Mensing.” Ind.
Health L. Rev. 12: 769.
O’Reilly, James T. 2007. “Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise.” Cornell L. Rev. 93: 939.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

50

Pew Research Center. 2017. “Government, Regulation and the Social Safety Net.”
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/2-government-regulation-and-thesocial-safety-net/.
Pinello, Daniel R. 1999. “Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A MetaAnalysis.” The Justice System Journal: 219–54.
Sachs, Rachel E. 2020. “Prescription Drug Affordability: A Bipartisan Goal?” American Bar
Association.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/he
alth-matters-in-elections/prescription-drug-affordability/.
Sallam, Malik. 2021. “COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Worldwide: A Concise Systematic Review
of Vaccine Acceptance Rates.” Vaccines 9(2): 160.
Schuck, Peter H. 2008. “FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the
Sweet Spot.” Roger Williams UL Rev. 13: 73.
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited. Cambridge University Press.
Seidenfeld, Mark. 2009. “Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of
Judicial Review.” Ohio St. LJ 70: 251.
Shapiro, David L. 1964. “The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy.” Harv. L. Rev. 78: 921.
Sharkey, Catherine M. 2008. “What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products
Liability Claims (Part II).”
Shipan, Charles R. 2000. “Legislators, Agencies, and Contemporaneous Influence: The Case of
FDA Monitoring Activities.”
———. 2004. “Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of
Congressional Influence.” American Political Science Review 98(3): 467–80.
Spriggs, James F. 1996. “The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A ResourceBased Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact.” American Journal of Political Science:
1122–51.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 2021. THE PUBLIC’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
UNITED STATES PUBLIH HEALTH SYSTEM. Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public
Health. https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/2021/05/RWJFHarvard-Report_FINAL-051321.pdf.
Thomson Reuters. “WestLaw Edge.” Thomson Reuters WestLaw Edge.
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.
Default).

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH

51

U.S. Federal Register. “Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government.”
federalregister.gov.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bagencies%5D%5B%5
D=food-and-drugadministration&conditions%5Bpublication_date%5D%5Byear%5D=2010&conditions%
5Bterm%5D=new+drug+application.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 2010a. 75 FR 9767 Classification of Benzoyl Peroxide as
Safe and Effective and Revision of Labeling to Drug Facts Format; Topical Acne Drug
Products for Over-The-Counter Human Use; Final Rule.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/03/04/2010-4424/classification-ofbenzoyl-peroxide-as-safe-and-effective-and-revision-of-labeling-to-drug-facts.
———. 2010b. 75 FR 7412 Reporting Information Regarding Falsification of Data.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/02/19/2010-3123/reportinginformation-regarding-falsification-of-data.
———. 2010c. 75 FR 15639 Revision of the Requirements for Constituent Materials.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/03/30/2010-7073/revision-of-therequirements-for-constituent-materials.
———. 2010d. 75 FR 19213 Use of Ozone-Depleting Substances; Removal of Essential-Use
Designation (Flunisolide, Etc.).
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/04/14/2010-8467/use-of-ozonedepleting-substances-removal-of-essential-use-designation-flunisolide-etc.
———. 2015a. 80 FR 55237 Administrative Destruction of Certain Drugs Refused Admission to
the United States. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/09/15/201523124/administrative-destruction-of-certain-drugs-refused-admission-to-the-unitedstates.
———. 2015b. 80 FR 57756 Clarification of When Products Made or Derived From Tobacco
Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations
Regarding “Intended Uses.”
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/09/25/2015-24313/clarification-ofwhen-products-made-or-derived-from-tobacco-are-regulated-as-drugs-devices-or.
———. 2015c. 80 FR 50762 Listing of Color Additives Exempt From Certification; Spirulina
Extract. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/08/21/2015-20676/listing-ofcolor-additives-exempt-from-certification-spirulina-extract.
———. 2019. “Drug Approval Process.” FDA Drug Approval Process.
https://www.fda.gov/media/82381/download.
———. “Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs.”
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm.
Ward, Michael R. 1992. “Drug Approval Overregaultion.” Regulation 15: 47.

PHARMACIST OF THE BENCH
Waxman, Henry. 2019. “Lower Drug Costs Now.” Lower Drug Costs Now.
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191003.118206/full/.
Wolfman, Brian, and Anne King. 2013. “Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and Its
Implications.”
Yolles, Maurice. 2019. “Governance through Political Bureaucracy: An Agency Approach.”
Kybernetes.
Zorn, Christopher, and Jennifer Barnes Bowie. 2010. “Ideological Influences on Decision
Making in the Federal Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment.” The Journal of
Politics 72(4): 1212–21.

52

